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HIGHER-ORDER ONE-MANY PROBLEMS IN PLATO‘S PHILEBUS AND RECENT 
AUSTRALIAN METAPHYSICS 
 
S. Gibbons and C. Legg 
 
We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to 
the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate 
them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the 
problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that 
contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one-many 
relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and part, and thereby 
construct three new ‗problems of the one and the many‘ (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus-
Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version 
generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain 
discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy. 
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1. Introduction: The Dispersal Problem 
Discussions of ‗the one-many problem‘ stretch back to the birth of philosophy. Any investigation 
into the nature of things seems to rely on individuating entities to talk or think about. Yet this 
exercise in itself raises thorny philosophical questions. In contemporary Australian metaphysics 
the problem is frequently understood to concern the relationship between so-called particulars 
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and universals (or Forms, in Platonic terminology
1
). We will refer to this as a hylomorphic 
understanding of the one-many problem. We believe however that discussion of the problem in 
Plato‘s Philebus is just as much concerned with relations between universals. To argue this, we 
identify and distinguish three problems which we believe lay equal claim to being ‗one-many‘ 
problems raised by the dialogue. They turn on relations of instantiation, subkind and part 
amongst Forms. The claim is not so much that Plato himself was thinking in terms of this three-
way taxonomy, as that it can be extracted from the dialogue in the light of contemporary 
understandings, whilst also raising issues so far unaddressed in contemporary metaphysical 
literature. Although consideration of these issues threatens to render realism about universals 
much more complex, we argue that it also has the potential to advance the view by exposing 
much richer conceptions of how universals might combine. 
The common contemporary understanding of the one-many problem is often drawn from 
Plato‘s Parmenides as follows. When we use a general predicate (for instance, describing Otto as 
an ox), are we thereby referring to some one thing (‗oxhood‘) which has a strange ‗spread-out‘ 
character, constituted by every particular ox and nothing else in the Universe? This does not 
seem to capture the distinctive character of oxhood, because there seems to be not just a part of 
oxhood in each ox – as is the case for a particular object whose parts extend spatially, such as a 
tree and its branches. Oxhood seems to be in some strange way wholly in each ox, for if a 
particular ox is destroyed, oxhood itself is not diminished, as is the case with our tree when a 
branch is destroyed. However, on the other hand, if one does say that the universal is wholly in 
each thing which instantiates it, and is in that sense many, then it seems that, ‗being one and the 
same, it will be at the same time, as a whole, in things that are many and separate; and thus it 
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 Forms are not quite the same as universals. However, in light of the shared higher-order function of Forms and 
universals, certain observations about Forms are able to shed light on certain aspects of universals. For this reason 
we will treat the terms as equivalent in this paper. 
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would be separate from itself‘ [Parmenides 131b1-2].2 Described this way the very idea sounds 
ludicrous and logically impossible. How could something be separate from itself? There is thus a 
problem of how oxhood can be a single thing while also being spread out among the many oxen.
3
 
Let us call this statement of the one-many problem the Dispersal Problem.  
2. Contemporary Responses to the Dispersal Problem: ‘Reified Hylomorphism’ 
Twentieth century analytic philosophy, insofar as it has discussed the one-many problem, has 
almost entirely understood it to be the Dispersal Problem. Thus Armstrong claims, ‗I think that 
the main argument for the existence of universals is Plato‘s ‗One over Many‘ [1980: 440], and 
argues [1978a: 2, 1980, 1997] that one must postulate universals because there can be many 
tokens of the one type, but this immediately raises the large question of what the type must be in 
order to be so dispersed. It is also worth noting that analytic philosophy has largely treated the 
problem as a problem in ontology construed, following Quine, as the attempt to list all the most 
general kinds of entities that exist. Quine‘s [1953] clever technical identification of one‘s 
ontological commitments with the values of one‘s bound variables neatly sidesteps the issue of 
exploring the natures of the entities in question, and the ways they might inter-relate. In this way 
his influence was crucial in shelving a long tradition of philosophical inquiry which 
systematically investigated modes of being (as opposed to invoking a catalogue of ‗what there 
is‘). 
The two main competing solutions to the Dispersal Problem are thus commonly regarded 
as positions concerning what exists. Nominalism is said to claim that only one kind of entity 
exists: particulars. Thus oxhood is a many (just the individual oxen). Realism is said to claim that 
                                                 
2
 All translations of Plato are from the Hackett edition [Cooper 1997]. Parmenides translation is thus Gill and Ryan. 
Line references are to Burnet‘s Oxford Clarendon Text. Any deviation from Hackett translations is noted. 
3
 For a contemporary summary of the problem viewed in this light, see Landesman [1971: 1].  
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two kinds of entities exist that are somehow fundamentally different on a metaphysical level, and 
yet related: particulars and universals. Thus oxhood is a one (over and above the individual 
oxen). This contemporary analytic realism about universals may therefore be referred to as a 
reified hylomorphism. As well as Armstrong it would appear to be advocated to at least some 
degree by the ‗Australian realists‘4 Michael Tooley [1977, 1987, 1990], Peter Forrest [1986a, 
1988], and Graham Oddie [1991, 2001].
5
 
Logically this opposition between realism and nominalism has the form of a dispute 
concerning whether the universe contains just chairs or chairs and tables, with all the discussions 
of the benefits of ontological parsimony that such debates typically engender. Following Quine‘s 
professed taste for ‗desert landscapes‘ [1953: 4], modern philosophers have largely come down 
on the side of the allegedly simpler theory and thus embrace nominalism.
6
 Thus Michael Devitt 
has described Armstrong as a ‗mirage realist‘ [1980: 433]. Likewise David Lewis initially 
claimed that the services universals render ‗could be matched using resources that are 
Nominalistic in letter, if perhaps not in spirit‘ [1983: 343], and later this agnosticism turned 
‗atheist‘ in a paper [1986a] which will be discussed below. 
However despite such criticisms, many extremely well-argued, realism about universals 
never quite seems to lose all its adherents. An intuition always seems to remain that nominalism 
lacks the resources to offer some kind of fundamental metaphysical explanation. Armstrong 
[1980: 441] has expressed this intuition particularly starkly: ‗I suggest that the fact of sameness 
of type is a Moorean fact. Any comprehensive philosophy must try to give some account of 
Moorean facts. They constitute the compulsory questions in the philosophical examination 
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 Australian by association and methodological sympathies if not current residency.   
5
 This is leaving aside those who advocate tropes, at least some of whom might also be argued to advocate reified 
hylomorphism of some form. 
6
 For a notable exception see Lowe [2006]. 
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paper.‘ He adds that it seems that sameness of type should consist in identity of something. The 
alternative would appear to be to say that sameness of token (i.e. identity, straightforwardly 
understood) and sameness of type (i.e. resemblance) are not ‗the same‘ [1980: 441-2]. Shouldn‘t 
sameness, of all things, be the same?     
A focus on positing the shortest possible list of fundamental kinds of existent entities as 
the key work of metaphysics is so pervasive today that it largely goes unquestioned. A large 
assumption lies behind this approach however. It presupposes that the most fundamental 
ingredients of the Universe, in a metaphysical analogue of Lego blocks, are always combined 
and recombined in world-making without changing their most fundamental properties. We will 
call this assumption ontological additivity.
7
 This assumption is for instance an unacknowledged 
axiom of David Lewis‘ influential Humean Supervenience.8 The assumption is axiomatic 
because if the ‗local matters‘ supervened on were to alter in different contexts, this would 
effectively vitiate supervenience.
9
 This neglects the possibility that the arrangement in which the 
constituents of the Universe are put together might affect how those constituents are in that 
context. We aim to explore this possibility.  
We claim that (somewhat ironically) in fact we may identify more than one one-many 
problem.
10
 We further claim that the one-many problem is logically prior to much current work 
in ontology,
11
 in the following sense. Contemporary analytic hylomorphic realism reifies 
particulars and universals to attempt to ‗solve‘ the one-many problem. That this approach could 
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 The view is named thus in homage to Oddie, one of the few contemporary metaphysicians to isolate such an 
assumption and subject it to systematic analysis, in his [2001]. 
8
 ‗[T]he doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing 
and then another‘ [1986: ix]. 
9
 It might be argued that Humean Supervenience is not restricted to this assumption but also includes the claim that 
no new entities come into being at higher levels of reality. However perhaps this is not a further claim if the new 
‗entities‘ in question might consist in new or different properties in the local matters. 
10
 Meinwald has already noted this [1996: 95]. 
11
 For a rich and subtle paper which argues this same position from the point of view of Plato and Aristotle 
scholarship, see [Gerson, 2004]. 
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never fully corral and treat the problem however is shown by the fact that the problem has 
recently reappeared purely within the realm of so-called ‗particulars‘. Thus philosophers have 
lately begun to worry that, because objects such as clouds and cats comprise countless water 
droplets and hairs, and each cloud or cat sans one water droplet or hair would be the same cloud 
or cat, there might be millions of clouds and cats in existence where common sense would see 
only one. Such discussions occupy a burgeoning recent literature on the so-called Problem of the 
Many.
12
  
Less often noted is that the problem equally reappears in the ‗one‘ – purely within the 
realm of so-called ‗universals‘. This will be the subject of this paper.  
3. The Philebus: Setting the Scene 
In the Philebus Socrates systematically pursues the question of which is superior in human life – 
Knowledge or Pleasure. Socrates argues that in fact ‗a third state‘ wins this contest, namely the 
right balance, mixture or harmonious structure of the two. Very early in the dialogue issues arise 
concerning how the many can be one or the one many. For Socrates begins by noting that the 
heterogeneity of pleasures will complicate their ranking task: 
If one just goes by the name it is one single thing, but in fact it comes in many forms that 
are in some way even quite unlike each other. Think about it: we say that a debauched 
person gets pleasure, as well as that a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very 
sobriety.  
[Philebus 12c6-d2]
13
  
Protarchus is willing to accept this fact at face value (‗So let it be agreed that there can be many 
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 See for instance Unger [1980], Lewis [1993] and Lowe [1995]. 
13
 The Philebus translation is Frede‘s; see note 2.  
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and unlike pleasures . . .‘ [14a8]14). But Socrates draws his attention to the philosophical 
perplexity which it raises: ‗For that the many are one and the one many are amazing statements, 
and can be easily disputed, whichever side of the two one may want to defend‘ [14c8-10]. 
However Socrates immediately makes a distinction between what he considers to be more and 
less serious one-many problems. In the not-so-serious category Protarchus describes a problem 
concerning the way a single person can be truly said to have many diverse and even apparently 
opposing characteristics, such as being tall and short, heavy and light, and in this way be ‗many 
―me‘s‖‘.15 We might call this the Inconsistent Properties Problem. Socrates dismisses such 
concerns as ‗childish and trivial but a serious impediment to argument if one takes them on‘ 
[14d7-8]. Socrates then dismisses a further problem which he describes himself. This problem 
puzzles over the way a single person is divisible into a variety of limbs and other physical parts, 
which are many, but is nevertheless one object: 
when someone who first distinguishes a person‘s limbs and parts asks your agreement 
that all these parts are identical with that unity, but then exposes you to ridicule because 
of the monstrosities you have to admit, that the one is many and indefinitely many, and 
again that the many are only one thing.  
[Philebus 14d8-e4] 
The issue here seems to be that of how many physical things can come together to form a unified 
whole, and so we might call this the Physical Combination Problem.  
One might argue that the latter is a real problem. Consider for example a table composed 
of four legs and a table-top. If a table is nothing but its parts, are we not unable to make a 
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 Frede [1993: 5]  translates ‗many and unlike kinds of pleasure‘, but there is nothing in the Greek which 
corresponds to her phrase ‗kinds of‘. 
15
 What precisely is the problem here? We believe a full answer to this question must examine the most fundamental 
motivation for Plato‘s positing of Forms over and above particulars, a vast undertaking. Thus since Socrates rejects 
this problem as not relevant to the subject at hand, for reasons of space we shall here do the same. 
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distinction between a table and a collection of table parts? Surely to be a table it must possess 
some sort of unity which makes it one thing, rather than five things organised in a particular 
way? Nevertheless Socrates claims that no explanation is needed here. One might ask why 
Socrates mentions this problem if he thinks that it is so pointless. Meinwald plausibly argues that 
it structurally mirrors the problem in which he is interested [1996: 99, 1998: 166-7].  
Socrates says the serious controversy, occurs where ‗the one is not taken from the things 
that come to be or perish . . .‘ [15a1-2]. In other words, he is talking about the Forms. He claims: 
when someone tries to posit man as one, or ox as one, or the beautiful as one, and the 
good as one, zealous concern with divisions of these unities and the like gives rise to 
controversy . . . Firstly whether one ought to suppose that there are any such unities truly 
in existence. Then again, how they are supposed to be: whether each one of them is 
always one and the same, admitting neither of generation nor of destruction; and whether 
it remains most definitely one and the same, even though it is afterwards found again 
among the things that come to be and are unlimited, so that it finds itself as one and the 
same in one and many things at the same time. And must it be treated as dispersed and 
multiplied or as entirely separated from itself, which would seem most impossible of all?  
[Philebus 15a4-b9] 
This is reminiscent of the Parmenides passage cited above. The problem Socrates explicitly 
describes here seems to be how a Form can be one while it is spread out among its many sensible 
participants. Viewed in this way it looks a good deal like the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem, 
and this is how it has frequently been read [Hackforth 1972: 20-21; Frede 1993: xxi-xxii, 6-7 of 
her translation; Benitez 1989: 29; Gosling 1975: 143
16
].  The difficulty with this is that there is 
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 Gosling goes on to point out the difficulties in treating the dispersal problem as the one-many problem [1975:143 
ff.].   
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no apparent discussion in the rest of the dialogue addressing the relationship between Forms and 
sensible particulars [c.f. Meinwald 1996: 96-97]. If this is the one-many problem, it is 
consequently ignored.  
4. The Genus-Species Problem
17
 
In view of this apparent mismatch, Constance Meinwald has argued that a second one-many 
problem can be identified in the text. She gives another reading to 15b2-4: ‗how each of these, 
[though it is divided into many species and sub-species] while not admitting generation or 
destruction, is nevertheless most securely this one‘.18 She argues that this is a (rather cryptic) 
reference to the way a Form is one while being divisible into many species and sub-species, a 
version of the one-many problem she has dubbed the Genus-Species Problem. In this way, she 
claims, we ‗see the problem as arising from both positing monads and dividing them while 
denying that they admit generation and destruction‘ [1996: 101]. The denial of generation and 
destruction is significant since this would be one way for a one to become many or for many to 
become one, as in the way ‗a large rough diamond can become many cut stones, or many pieces 
of wood a violin . . .‘ [Meinwald 1996: 101]. Thus the genus-species problem can be contrasted 
with our earlier example of the table: the many table parts constitute one table because they came 
together physically (when the table was ‗generated‘). Such a solution is not available for eternal, 
unchanging Forms. 
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 We name it thus following Meinwald [1998: 165]. Like Meinwald, we use ‗genus‘ and ‗species‘ merely as a 
convenient way to refer to this type of relationship.  
18
 This is how Meinwald says we should understand these words [1996: 100], although her insertion makes this just 
as much an interpretation as a translation. There are two ways of punctuating the Greek here, and it has led to much 
discussion. Burnet‘s OCT prints a question mark after ‗tautên‘ in line 15b4, thus dividing the text there into three 
questions about Forms, rather than two. Many translators omit the question mark, preferring to read two questions 
[Frede 1993: 7, xxi-xxiii; Gosling 1975: 5, 143 ff.; Hackforth 1972: 20]. Gosling and Frede comment of the 
difficulties in making sense of a middle question [Gosling 1975: 145-6, 148-9; Frede 1993: xxii]. See also Benitez 
[1989: 25-30]. However, there is also agreement that the division into three questions is a more natural way to take 
the Greek [Gosling 1975: 145; Frede 1993: xxii; Benitez 1989: 25]. Meinwald argues that the alternative, of 
supposing that these lines say nothing much, is unpalatable, and that the context provides sufficient information for 
us to work out what is intended.  
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The genus-species relationship is interestingly different from the part-whole relationship. 
Cathood does not exhaust mammalhood (there are mammals that are not cats), and yet an 
individual cat is not a part of any individual mammal, nor does it instantiate some kind of part-
mammalhood. Every cat is a mammal – fully. And yet nevertheless in some sense mammalhood 
comprises cathood (as well as foxhood, doghood and so on). So how does mammalhood manage 
to be the same (one) thing given that cats, foxes and dogs are different kinds of animals and their 
mammalhood thereby takes correspondingly different forms? More relevant to the dialogue is the 
example of Pleasure we began with. How does Pleasure manage to be one thing in, for instance,  
depraved serial killings and serene mathematical contemplations? What kind of a ‗one‘ could 
that be? 
Identification of this one-many problem has the significant advantage that genus-species 
relationships definitely figure in the text.
19
  
5. The Eidetic Combination Problem 
However in our view a further one-many problem may be extracted from the crucial lines [15a4-
b9], which is even more relevant to the dialogue as a whole. The conclusion of the dialogue is 
that the good life is a mixed life, which must contain both Pleasure and Knowledge in their 
correct forms, and balanced correctly. When Socrates speaks of ‗the Good Life‘ he is not 
speaking of individual instances of good lives, such as Socrates‘ life has been. He is referring to 
some sort of abstract good life beyond its sensible instances. We can therefore refer to this as a 
‗Form‘ containing within it the correct mixture of Pleasure and Knowledge.  
This is not a genus-species relationship. It is not that Pleasure and Knowledge are types 
or kinds of the Good Life. If they were, then someone who participated in Knowledge alone 
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 Pleasure is divided into types at 36c ff. Knowledge is thus divided at 55c ff. The dialogue includes other 
examples, such as the division of colour and shape at 12e.  
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would thereby participate in the Good Life, just as an animal which participates in Cathood alone 
thereby participates in Mammalhood.
20
. But this is not the case. Therefore Knowledge is not a 
species of the Good Life. Rather, the Good Life is a complex object that somehow draws 
together two quite different and unrelated things into one. Nor is this an instance of the Dispersal 
Problem, since Pleasure and Knowledge themselves are not instances of the Good Life, merely 
constituents of it. In this sense then, asking how exactly the two combine into one Good Life 
may be regarded as another, distinct sort of one-many problem. We might call this last problem 
an Eidetic Combination Problem. We now see the analogy between this and Socrates‘ rejected 
Physical Combination Problem (concerning objects such as bodies and tables), since it is a 
combination problem. 
Why does the Combination Problem hit home for Forms? Its logical structure is as 
follows. Suppose objects A and B join together to make C. To be one thing, C has to be 
sufficiently united to constitute a one, and not just the concatenation of A and B. But if C is 
sufficiently united to yield a one, it may become sufficiently united to cease to be A and B at 
all.
21
 
Let us once again consider a physical example for contrast.  Suppose A and B are two 
puddles. With the addition of just a little extra water (or a strong wind), they become one puddle. 
But when they become one, the puddles A and B disappear. Insofar as A and B remain, they can 
only ever be a collection of two distinct puddles. Insofar as they become one, A and B are no 
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 Or a person who is an angler is thereby a hunter: c.f. Sophist 218e-221c. The method of collection and division, 
prominent in the Sophist and the Statesman, has the following feature: if Form A is divided into species B and C, 
and individual x participates in Form B, x must also participate in genus A. 
21
 For Socrates, this is a general concern.  Consider Theaetetus 203a-205e. If the syllable SO is just the letters S and 
O, then knowledge of S and O should be sufficient for knowledge of SO, and vice versa, but it is not [203d]. If SO is 
a new form arising from the combination of S and O, it ceases to have S and O as parts, and so can‘t be composed of 
them [204a, 205b]. Socrates summarises these points at 205d-e. 
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longer identifiable. Thus this case does not present a one-many problem: puddles are either one 
or many, but not both.  
In the Good Life however, Knowledge and Pleasure are both still present – the liver of 
such a life does not cease to know or to enjoy. Thus here the one concerned is also at the same 
time a many. When the one is formed, the many which contribute to it remain distinct and 
identifiable, at the very same time as the object is a genuine one. (Note that the same is true of 
the Genus-Species Problem and the Dispersal Problem for Forms.) Socrates suggests that we 
lack an adequate account of how an object can be sufficiently united that it comprises a genuine 
unity, while simultaneously being internally complex.
22
  
So, the Eidetic Combination Problem is the difficulty of how disparate Forms such as 
Knowledge and Pleasure can be combined to form a genuine unity without thereby losing their 
distinctness. One might wonder, why doesn‘t the same one-many problem arise for physical 
objects which unlike the puddles have heterogeneous parts? The human body in Socrates‘ 
disdained example [14e] is comprised of arms, legs, a head, and other parts distinguishable by 
different shapes and functions. Why does not this diversity mean that a physical body is subject 
to this combinatorial one-many problem? The crucial difference is that, as generated objects, the 
complexity of physical objects can be analysed by means of their spatial arrangement, allowing 
an independent means of individuating such entities as having many parts whilst not being many 
things. My head is my head and not an independent object as it functions alongside my other 
body-parts in a spatially integrated organism. Forms however were not generated and are not 
arranged in space. One might therefore say that the only individuation they have is eidetic. This 
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 It is true of all three eidetic one-many problems that the object concerned must somehow be sufficiently united to 
constitute a genuine one, and yet it must have internal complexity without that complexity compromising its unity. 
As this is a feature of all three one-many problems, it could be said to be the one-many problem. 
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is why the one-many problem is harder for them. In other words, if serial-killer pleasure and 
mathematician pleasure differ as Forms, why are they not entirely different things?  
We may now identify three one-many problems which contrary to 20
th
 century reified 
hylomorphic treatments of the problem can be constructed purely in the realm of Forms. They 
turn on three different relations: instantiation, subkind and part respectively: 
1. The Eidetic Dispersal Problem: How can a Form be one while dispersed throughout its 
participants? (E.g. What is the ontological connection between goodness instantiated in 
military valour and in compassionate charity work?) 
2. The Genus-Species Problem: How can a Form be one while divisible into species and 
subspecies? (E.g. how is Mammal divisible into Cat and Dog, and yet still united in a 
seamless Form of mammalhood?) 
3. The Eidetic Combination Problem: How can a Form be one while a mixture of disparate 
and unrelated ingredients? (E.g. How is the Good Life one yet containing both 
Knowledge and Pleasure?) 
[insert figure 1 here] 
6. Distinctness of the Problems 
One might wish to argue that the Eidetic Dispersal Problem (unlike the Hylomorphic Dispersal 
Problem) collapses into the Genus-Species Problem, as the only way in which it is intelligible to 
talk of Forms dispersing over Forms is if the latter are subkinds of the former. Thus for instance 
one might argue that in our example, military valour and compassionate charity are both kinds of 
goodness. However one can distinguish in principle an instantiation from a subkind relation 
14 
 
between Forms.
23
 For instance, consider the famous mixing of the kinds passage in the Sophist. 
There the relationship between the ‗great kinds‘ is referred to as one of participation no fewer 
than 11 times.
24
 The suggestion is that when Being participates in Difference it thereby becomes 
one of the things which are different  i.e. an instance of Difference  rather than a type or 
species of Difference. In other words, the claim, ‗Being is different from other Forms‘ may be 
distinguished from, ‗All things which have being are things that are different‘.25  
In more contemporary terms, such a distinction exists in our set-theoretic framework 
which distinguishes between a class-instance relation which requires that the class possess an 
order one greater than its instance, and a class-subclass relation which does not trigger such 
ascension. Whether these 20
th
 century mathematical tools are the last word in interpreting the 
relations of instantiation and subkind discernable in Plato (and if not those, which tools might or 
should one use) is a question deserving of deep reflection.  
Alternatively, one might worry that the Eidetic Dispersal and Combination Problems 
collapse together in that, as Forms are not spatiotemporally located, the distinction between their 
parts and their instances must be somewhat hazy.  However the key logical issue is whether the 
part-or-instance of a Universal U may itself be said to ‗be (a) U‘. (We might call this property 
name inheritance.) If not, it is a part. If so, it is an instance. As noted earlier, when Pleasure and 
Knowledge combine to form the Good Life it is not the case that either alone would constitute a 
good life. Rather, much of the point of the dialogue consists in establishing that this is not so. It 
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 The distinction is commonly made in the literature as a distinction between two kinds of predication. So, Vlastos 
distinguishes between ‗ordinary predication‘ (which can be between Forms), and ‗Pauline predication‘ (which 
according to his analysis functions like a class inclusion relationship) [Vlastos 1970, especially: 270-276]; Meinwald 
distinguishes between ‗tree predication‘ (predication pros heauto) and ‗ordinary predication‘ (predication pros ta 
alla) [Meinwald 1991: 56-75]. The different sorts of predication are used to assert different ontological claims, and 
thus deserve different ontological analyses. 
24
Metalambanein or metechein and their cognates are used at 251d7, 251e10, 255b1, 255b3, 255e5, 256a1, 256a7, 
256b1, 256b6, 256d9, and 256e3. 
25
 Vlastos [1970] shows the two types of claim are differentiable. Vlastos thinks Plato remains unaware of the 
distinction. We would dispute this, but cannot pursue it here. It will suffice that the distinction can indeed be drawn. 
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was also noted above that one problem with claiming that instantiated oxen form parts of oxhood 
is that if an ox is destroyed it seems that oxhood itself is not in any way diminished (as is a tree 
when its branches—genuine parts—are destroyed).  
The final duo within our triad to be considered, then, is the Genus-Species Problem and 
the Eidetic Combination Problem. Are these really distinct? One influential argument that they 
are not is provided by Lewis‘ Parts of Classes [1991]. This book seeks to reduce the subclass 
relation to the part-whole relation (where the latter receives a particular axiomatised 
interpretation within contemporary mereology), claiming, ‗One class is a part of another iff the 
first is a subclass of the second‘ [Lewis 1991: 4], and, ‗the subclass relation and the part-whole 
relation behave alike. Just as a part of a part is itself a part, so a subclass of a subclass is itself a 
subclass; whereas a member of a member is not in general a member‘ [Lewis 1991: 5]26.  
However we believe that there are equally crucial logical differences between the two. 
One concerns property inheritance. If Kitten is a subclass of Cat then it follows that if all cats are 
mammals, all kittens are mammals. However the fusion of Cat Tails is a mereological part of 
Cat, but it is not right to infer that if all cats are mammals, all cat tails are mammals. To avoid 
such a result, Lewis is forced to maintain a sharp ontological distinction between classes and 
individuals (his ‗Division Thesis‘), and to hold that although Bruce‘s tail is part of Bruce the cat, 
the singleton class containing Bruce‘s tail is an entity metaphysically distinct from Bruce’s 
(individual) tail
27
 and not a part of it, and it is not a subclass/part of any class containing Bruce.  
This maneuvering is arguably analogous to treating all circles as ‗squares with very 
rounded corners‘. One may be able to translate all statements about circles into statements about 
                                                 
26
 In the latter parts of the book Lewis claims to ‗regain‘ all of set theory, by deriving ‗[f]rom the axioms and 
definitions of mereologized arithmetic . . . the standard axioms for iterative set theory‘ [Lewis 1991: 100]. 
27
 This claim has caused puzzlement amongst metaphysicians, e.g. [Forrest 1991]. 
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rounded squares without rendering them false. But what of the distinct mathematical properties 
of the circle  for instance, that the ratio between circumference and radius is always ? In an 
ontology purely consisting of squares, either: i) this necessary connection is lost in ‗noise‘ and 
unstatable, or ii) if the necessary connection is established and stated for a ‗special kind of 
square‘, this constitutes acknowledgment by stealth of a distinct ontological category. Property 
inheritance through the subclass relation is such a necessary connection, and Lewis‘s attempted 
reduction of subclass to part arguably promises i) but delivers ii).  
In summary, then, through this section we have argued that relations R1, R2 and R3 are 
all sui generis and mutually irreducible. This constitutes a distinctive kind of realism concerning 
relations (which, moreover, is arguably not inappropriate to relations as opposed to particular 
things, for which the key question is, ‗Do they exist?‘).  
In the rest of this paper we hold our new taxonomy (fig. 1) up against contemporary 
Australian metaphysics. We begin in the next section with the views of D.M. Armstrong. We 
will see that he attempts to explain away our genus-species relations (R2) as partial identity 
between universals. He admits that in certain circumstances it is right to say that universals 
instantiate (R1) higher-order universals, but fails to follow up an inconsistency between this and 
his arguments for first-order realism. Parthood relations between universals (R3) receive his 
most complex discussion, regarding the possibility of ‗structural universals‘. He admits such 
universals but we will argue that his account of their combination is excessively logically simple, 
and that overall, he creates a de facto higher-order nominalism.  
In section 8 we consider Lewis. Lewis is of course a nominalist who would regard 
higher-order ontological commitments with dismay. However he is interesting in the present 
context for two reasons. First, in his later work he may be understood as attempting wherever 
17 
 
possible to reduce fundamental ontological relations to mereology (R3).
28
 Such ambitious 
attempted elegance provides valuable grist for metaphysical investigation. Second, in a little-
discussed paper [1986a] he provides a useful critical discussion of Armstrong‘s views on 
structural universals, and in particular how they might combine. On the one hand he disagrees 
with Armstrong that structural universals exist, and claims that Armstrong‘s key examples 
should be understood as combinations not of universals but individuals. On the other hand there 
are intriguing similarities in the two metaphysicians‘ treatment of key examples: both try to 
account for them using a single, simple combination relation which joins components while 
leaving them unchanged. This demand unites Lewis‘ earlier and later work, and in this way both 
Lewis and Armstrong commit to what we earlier dubbed ‗ontological additivity‘. 
Given this, we close the paper (section 9) by arguing that neither Armstrong nor Lewis 
can account for the Philebus’ key example of combination: Pleasure and Knowledge combining 
to form the Good Life. This example is, we suggest, precisely intended to show the possibility of 
universals blending into structures which cannot be analysed by means of any univocal 
combination relation. The overall moral is that if universals are relations, and they are many, the 
possible relations between universals must themselves be many, a thorough-going Platonic 
realism needs to allow for that, and there are prima facie reasons to believe such a realism is true. 
7. Higher-Order ones and Manies in Contemporary Australian Metaphysics I: Armstrong 
Armstrong called the metaphysical explanation of sameness of type a compulsory question on 
the philosophical examination paper. One may postulate universals as an explanation of 
sameness of type between particulars if one wishes. However we have seen that once one 
                                                 
28
 Although his early work held the fundamental constituents of reality to be ‗possibilia—particular individual things 
. . .—together with the iterative hierarchy of classes built up from them‘ [Lewis 1983: 343], 1991‘s Parts of Classes 
sought the ambitious reduction mentioned above. 
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postulates universals, sameness of type seems to occur between them also. So are we not faced 
with a further ‗compulsory question‘? 
Armstrong gives some thought to this. He is loath to postulate higher-order universals, no 
doubt conscious that this will offend his ockhamist contemporaries further. He therefore claims 
that certain apparent examples of sameness of type in universals can be accounted for without 
this. Consider for instance, ‗Red is more like orange than yellow‘. He claims this consists in ‗an 
internal relation, one that flows necessarily from the nature of the terms‘, adding, ‗where we 
have an internal relation[s] there we do not have anything ontologically extra over and above the 
related terms . . .‘ [1989: 100]. Of course the next obvious question is whether these internal 
relations, albeit not separate entities, require any metaphysical explanation. Armstrong considers 
the possibility that they might be primitive and unanalysable [1989: 105]. However this seems 
inconsistent in one who is so hard on first-order resemblance nominalism for resting on 
unanalysable resemblance. Thus Armstrong [1989: 106]
29
  also considers the possibility of 
explicating resemblance between universals as partial identity between them: 
We can now understand the (reasonably close) resemblance between the properties being 
five kilos in mass and being four kilos in mass . . . a four-kilo object is a large proportion 
of a five-kilo object. The bigger the part, the closer to identity, and so the closer the 
resemblance. 
Where does this issue of colour-resemblance fall according to our taxonomy of one-many 
problems? Armstrong would seem to view it as a ‗Genus-Species‘ rather than an ‗Eidetic 
Dispersal‘ issue insofar as his refusal to ascend to a higher ontological level suggests (in our 
                                                 
29
 See also Armstrong [1978b: 48-52, 101-131]. 
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contemporary, post-Russell‘s Paradox context) that he sees the internal relations which 
determine colour resemblance as sub-kind rather than instantiation.
30
 
Armstrong does claim that higher-order universals are needed in some contexts however 
– most notably to explain scientific laws. He believes that laws of nature are more than mere 
Humean regularities, rather, ‗a matter of the presence of one property ensuring, or 
probabilifying, the presence of another‘ [1989: 101].31 These relations, unlike colour relations, 
are external and therefore in need of further explanation and thus (by his lights) a new entity. 
However we now have a target for our Eidetic Dispersal Problem. Imagine for instance that law 
of nature L consists in a necessary relationship between magnetic field M and attractive force F. 
This particular relationship between M and F holds in an indefinite number of situations. Why is 
this? In what sense are these the same situation and in what sense are they different situations? If 
it is objected that ‗they just are‘ (the same), and some commonalities between situations are 
primitive, why cannot the same be said about commonalities between, say, individual oxen, 
which Armstrong claimed cried out for metaphysical explanation?  
Finally, what of our Combination Problem? Prima facie it would appear that Armstrong 
opens the door to this problem by claiming that universals combine to form structural universals 
[1978b, 1986, 1989, 1997].
32
 He postulates such universals initially in order to explain 
resemblance among universals, to truth-make scientific laws beyond a certain level of logical 
complexity, and to avoid begging the question whether entirely simple universals exist.
33
 In 
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 It may be objected that Armstrong‘s problem of explaining colour-resemblance is not strictly isomorphic with our 
Genus-Species Problem as the latter asks for an explanation of sameness of type between a ‗parent‘ and ‗child‘ class 
(e.g. mammal and cat), while the former pertains to ‗siblings‘ (fellow-children of the class coloured things). 
Nevertheless it seems we could generalize our Genus-Species Problem to a problem concerning the grounds of any 
taxonomic relationship, the solution of which could then be generalized to the specific ‗family‘ relationships above. 
31
 See also Armstrong [1997: section 15.2]. 
32
 Armstrong is not the only Australian metaphysician to commit to structural universals. See for instance Forrest 
[1986a, 1986b]. 
33
 Armstrong [1978b: 69-71]. 
20 
 
[1997] he distinguishes between genuine (‗paradigm‘) structural universals (e.g. methane) and 
mere conjunctive universals (e.g. being green and round). The difference is that in the former 
‗[t]he constituent properties and relations are instantiated by particulars that are proper parts of 
the particular that has the structural property‘ [1997: 32]. Thus for instance being methane 
consists in having a part that is hydrogen and not carbon, and another part that is carbon and not 
hydrogen, whereas for green and round the smallest unit of analysis is the whole thing which has 
both properties.  
What enables these proper parts to combine however? Armstrong begins by suggesting: 
at least one further relation R (in the case of methane, R is the binary relation bonded). However 
he goes on to claim that methane (and thus any structural universal) is reducible to (‗identical 
with‘) a conjunction of atomic states of affairs.34 This arguably approaches higher-order 
nominalism in that logical conjunction might now be said to be his fundamental ontological 
combination relation. For when he examines the converse possibility (that every conjunction of 
states of affairs might constitute a structural universal) he does not deny this. He merely denies 
that every conjunction of states of affairs might constitute an ‗interesting‘ structural universal 
[1997: 35].  
To sum up Armstrong, then, although he argues strenuously for first-order realism about 
universals, he largely seems to abandon realism at the higher-order, through what might be 
termed an eliminativism about genus-species relations, and a failure to raise the same Dispersal 
Problem at the higher order that he pursued at the first. He allows that universals combine but 
does not seem troubled by our Eidetic Combination Problem. Whether he should be will be 
                                                 
34
 In the case of a methane molecule which has 4 atoms of hydrogen (labelled a-d) and 1 atom of carbon (e) the full 
conjunction would be: Ha & Hb & Hc & Hd & Ce & Bae & Bbe & Bce & Bde. 
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discussed further below. 
8. Higher-Order ones and Manies in Contemporary Australian Metaphysics II: Lewis 
The most extended discussion of ‗problems regarding the combining of universals‘ is Lewis in 
his [1986a]. He rejects structural universals by offering three possibilities for how universals 
might combine, and arguing that all face irresolvable difficulties. First he offers a linguistic 
conception: that, ‗[a] structural universal is a set-theoretic construction out of simple universals, 
in just the way that a (parsed) linguistic expression can be taken as a set-theoretic construction 
out of its words‘ [1986a: 31]. The problem with this is that because sets are constructed out of 
simples (there is a basic element relation), it does not cover the possibility of ‗structures all the 
way down‘.  
The second possibility Lewis offers is the pictorial conception, according to which ‗a 
structural universal is isomorphic to its instances‘ [1986a: 33]. There is a methane universal 
which exists over and above all methane molecules and somehow manages to have the same 
shape or arrangement as they do. The problem here is that on this conception, ‗a structural 
universal is an individual, not a set‘ [1986a: 33]. He claims this triggers an interesting ‗new 
problem of one over many within the structural universal itself‘ [1986a: 39] as follows: 
Each methane molecule has not one hydrogen atom but four. So if the structural universal 
methane is to be an isomorph of the molecules that are its instances, it must have the 
universal hydrogen as a part not just once, but four times over . . . But what can it mean 
for something to have a part four times over? What are there four of? There are not four 
of the universal hydrogen . . . there is only one.  
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[Lewis 1986a: 34]
35
 
To address this, Lewis considers that one might abandon the idea that the structural 
universal is isomorphic to its instances, but continue to ‗hold that a structural universal is a 
mereological composite, having as parts the simpler universals that it involves‘ [1986a: 36]. The 
problem here though is that, once one fails to individuate structural universals by their structure, 
different structural universals might be composed of the same ingredients. For example there is 
now no difference between butane and methane which are both composed of carbon, hydrogen 
and bonded. And for Lewis that ‗two different things‘ might be ‗composed of exactly the same 
parts‘ is unacceptable. In other words, a mereological part-whole relation between individuals is 
the only combination-relation.
36
 
Finally Lewis offers the magical conception, according to which ‗a structural universal 
has no proper parts‘ [1986a: 41]. The problem here is that one lacks any metaphysical 
explanation of the universal‘s nature and necessary connections. Thus in our example of 
methane, one can no longer claim that burning methane must emit carbon dioxide because it has 
a carbon part. ‗This necessary connection is just a brute modal fact‘ [1986a: 41], ‗[a]lthough we 
understand just what necessary connections are supposed to obtain, we are given no notion how 
they possibly could‘ [1986a: 42]. To sum up Lewis, then, in keeping with his Humean 
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 In [1986: 88] Armstrong proffers a solution to this challenge in terms of some universals being ‗particularizable‘, 
and thus repeatable, but it is not clear why this should happen in the case of some universals (e.g. hydrogen atom) 
and not others (e.g. lead). 
36
 In fact, an interesting recent paper has pointed out that even granting that the mereological part-whole relation 
between individuals is the only combination-relation, Lewis‘ claim that two different things cannot be composed of 
the same parts does not follow. This is because a distinction can be drawn in principle between ‗entities that are 
parts‘ and ‗parthood slots‘, which is intuitively obvious in the case of other relations which may obtain ‗many times 
over‘, such as cousinhood. This allows that a given set of entities might fill a given set of parthood slots in a number 
of different ways. The paper presents a well worked-out formal mereology embodying the distinction [Bennett 
[forthcoming]].  
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Supervenience he claims that the only ontological combination relation consists in mereological 
summing over individuals, and denies the existence of structural universals for this reason.  
Forrest [1986b] argues that Lewis‘ entire attack on structural universals is predicated on a 
thesis Forrest dubs Mereology or Magic, which he claims trades on a crucial ambiguity between 
being part of and being a part of. The latter, he claims, is what Lewis has in mind when he 
speaks of parts, and consists in a mere listing of discrete ingredients. However Forrest claims the 
former has an equal claim to the meaning of our English ‗part‘, and the components it refers to 
are not discrete. Rather they are not individuable apart from the means by which we choose to 
carve them out. By assuming Mereology or Magic Lewis unjustly neglects this option. Forrest 
[1986b: 89] writes: 
Our childhood paradigms of the latter concept are the bits and pieces of construction toys. 
Our childhood paradigms of the part/whole relation are more concerned with the division 
of fairly homogeneous items, as when we only got part of the cake.   
This use of the construction toy metaphor is telling, and grist for our attack on ontological 
additivity. However examples we discuss below will suggest that Forrest‘s identification of the 
latter, ‗human-carved‘ ontological analysis with ‗fairly homogeneous items‘ is a red herring. 
9. The Combination Problem Reconsidered: What is Combination? What is the Problem? 
Now, however, we should ask whether Lewis‘ ‗problems regarding the combining of universals‘ 
are the same as our Combination Problem. In fact there are some important differences. The key 
issue in the Philebus is how Pleasure and Knowledge combine in the Good Life. Ontological 
additivity assumes that the key issue in ‗world-making‘ is identifying the fundamental 
ingredients. After that, what remains is a simple concatenation of quantities of each type via 
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some simple, single combination relation (mereology for Lewis, and for Armstrong, logical 
conjunction of atomic states of affairs). 
But the combination of Pleasure and Knowledge in the Good Life is much more than any 
mere concatenation of ‗atoms of pleasure‘ and ‗atoms of knowledge‘. These entities are richly 
structured and systemic  both within themselves and in the combination which results in the 
best human life.
37
 The largest part of the dialogue is in fact devoted to exploring that structure.
38
 
Kenneth Sayre [2002: 181] has argued that this discussion of eidetic structure is part of an 
evolution in Plato‘s theory of Forms, from an earlier logical atomism to a more complex picture: 
In the account of the Phaedo and the Republic, a form‘s reality lay in its utter simplicity, 
hence in its inability to admit opposing properties. The Beautiful itself was in no way 
ugly . . . By the time of the Sophist . . . this tenet has been modified to allow Sameness to 
be different from other forms, and Difference to be the same as itself. Moving into the 
Philebus, we find ourselves dealing with forms that not only lack simplicity but that stand 
outside of any relation of opposition (what is the opposite of Middle C?). The reality of 
these forms lies instead in their being single and fixed, and hence independent of 
temporal change. They are single in virtue of being one . . .  
To hold that Forms are single merely in virtue of being one, skates dangerously close to 
tautology. (Under the earlier, more logical atomist view of universals one can invoke something 
that might be termed ‗eidetic homogeneity‘ to ground the unity of a universal, but not now.) We 
suggest that this throws extra emphasis on the one-many problem, lending support to our 
contention that it is a crucial structuring problem in the Philebus.  
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 In the same vein Rosen has written, ‗The cosmos is not a totality of homogeneous and neutral monads but a 
harmony or communion of reciprocally enabling natures‘ [unpublished: viii]. 
38
 The structure of Pleasure is explored at 31b to 55c. The structure of Knowledge is explored at 55c to 59d. In 59e-
64e  their proper mixture is discussed. 
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Arguably the key presentation of the Combination Problem occurs right near the end of 
the dialogue: 
That any kind of mixture that does not in some way or other possess measure or the 
nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For 
there would be no blending in such cases at all but really an uncontrolled medley, the ruin 
of whatever happens to be contained in it.  
[Philebus 64d9-e3] 
The message here is that the nature of the combination can change everything in a mixture, in a 
way which is not at all like Lego, where one can rearrange the parts in all kinds of ways but they 
themselves remain the same. Consider for example a person‘s character. It is possible that just a 
touch more pride, turning the person to hubris, might spoil all their other good qualities  thus 
what could manifest as perseverance turns to stubbornness, what could manifest as courage turns 
to rashness, and so on.  
Thus our Combination Problem may in fact be understood to have a number of levels:  
i) A problem of wholes. How is it possible that by combining A and B one obtains something 
emergent, C, and yet A and B are still present? One might argue that Lewis‘ account falls at this 
problem, by failing to do justice to there being a C to speak of. (His mereological approach only 
allows the many, and gives no convincing account of a one.
39
) Armstrong on the other hand 
arguably copes with this problem by defining a structural universal as having proper parts, yet 
not being identical to them insofar as they are combined by a further structural relation R.
40
 In 
this way he can explain C being something more than merely A and B via the addition of R, and 
                                                 
39
 A very useful extended critique of Lewis‘ reductive mereological account of combination is given by Harte [2002: 
20-7]. She calls the reductive view Lewis invokes ‗ontological innocence‘ concerning combination, but also astutely 
notes that he in fact resiles from full commitment in the letter to this position by the qualificatory phrase ‗so to 
speak‘ [2002: 22]. The end result is a sweeping reductionism slightly muddied.  
40
 In the case of methane strictly speaking R is a particular complex of instances of the relation bonded. 
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he can explain the continued presence of A and B in C by stating that they are proper parts of it. 
ii) A problem of structure. How is it possible that mixing A and B one way might result in C and 
mixing them in another way might result in something quite other (D)? This is a possibility 
Lewis strictly forbids, but here his commitment to mereology seems to produce demonstrably 
problematic consequences. In fact Armstrong notes that in this regard Lewis faces a much more 
general problem than a relatively recondite concern about structural universals  he is forced to 
deny that any atomic state of affairs aRb might differ from bRa [Armstrong 1986: 85]. Once 
again however it appears that Armstrong can handle such cases, by claiming that the difference is 
that in C, A and B are combined with relation R, and in D, A and B are combined with another 
relation (S).
41
  
iii) A problem of blending. However these formulations of the problem do not yet speak to our 
final quotation from Philebus 64d9-e3. Here the nature of the combination is more ‗intimate‘ 
than we have yet done justice to. Its formal structure might perhaps be indicated as follows: A 
and B combine and blend utterly  the metaphor offered by the dialogue is mixing two liquids in 
a cup [61c]  such that A’s very relationship with B enables A to manifest as C and B’s very 
relationship with A enables B to manifest as D.
42
 This is the true denial of ontological additivity. 
Although Armstrong‘s account of structural universals adds a further relation R, in the posited 
structural universal, R, A and B all remain the same. In a methane molecule carbon is still 
carbon, hydrogen is still hydrogen and bondedness is still bondedness. By contrast, in the case of 
Knowledge and Pleasure combining to form the Good Life, the constituents are not the end-
product‘s proper parts. Arguably there is no part of the Good Life that is all Knowledge and no 
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 To spell this out in the simplest logical form possible: (Aa & Bb & Rab) and (Aa  & Bb & Sab) are obviously not 
logically equivalent. 
42
 These words have been extremely carefully chosen. It is tempting to say that the presence of B turns A into C, and 
the presence of A turns B into D. But the problem with this is that Forms, being ‗not taken from the things that come 
to be or perish . . .‘ [Philebus 15a1-2] cannot themselves alter. 
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Pleasure, and vice versa. Relatedly, there is no relation R combining the two whose nature is 
describable independently of the structured natures of the key ingredients of Knowledge and 
Pleasure, which determine how they mingle. (We might say that in this case, ‗K and P 
themselves are R‘.) 
Yet at the same time this is not like the conjunctive universal green and round, since A 
blended with B is not the same as A alone (and vice versa), whereas green is green whatever 
shape it is instantiated in. Thus Armstrong‘s account of universal-combination falls here. Yet 
only at this third level of the Combination Problem do we finally meet the key questions 
concerning the Good Life in the Philebus: How does Knowledge inform and structure Pleasure? 
How does Pleasure enliven Knowledge? What is the correct blend and harmony between the two 
in actual lived human lives?  
One moral of this discussion is that Forms as invoked in the Philebus are more 
individually structured and more richly integrated with one another than much discussion of their 
descendent ‗universals‘ in contemporary metaphysics would suggest. Their integration is as 
important as their ideality for the philosophical work they do. By missing this, Lewis arguably 
fails to see an obvious answer to his problem with the pictorial conception of structural 
universals. Given that every methane molecule contains four hydrogen atoms, he asked, ‗what 
can it mean for something to have a part four times over? What are there four of? There are not 
four of the universal hydrogen . . . there is only one . . . The pictorial conception as I have 
presented it has many virtues, but consistency is not one of them‘ [Lewis 1986a: 34]. Here 
however he appears to take for granted that the ingredient universals must be hydrogen, carbon 
and bonded. One candidate he failed to consider was four. But this is precisely the kind of 
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structure that might really assist in explaining methane‘s properties and behavior.43 
How does all this speak to our eidetic one-many problems? Each universal is one, but 
also many. An explanation of how a universal is many has to do much more than note its 
maniness, or bundle that maniness together into a one – it has to be able to describe how that 
maniness is organised. That principle of organisation will itself be complex, because a universal 
can be complex in more than one way, as we have seen, and to make the matter even more 
complex the very act of combination may alter how the ingredients are in that context. Reified 
hylomorphism is ill-equipped to deal with this. 
Plato‘s own answer to the one-many problem in the Philebus therefore arguably involves 
abandoning the notions of ‗one‘ and ‗many‘ in favour of peras and apeiron, frequently translated 
as ‗limit‘ and ‗the unlimited‘. Using these concepts he builds an account which we believe 
allows him to deal with unity and complexity in all its forms. But that is a story for another 
paper. 
10. Conclusion 
We have identified three new one-many problems which occur purely in the realm of Forms, 
turning respectively on the relations of instantiation, subkind and part, which we have argued are 
all mutually irreducible. For a reified hylomorphism to postulate universals to attempt to explain 
first-order sameness of type and simultaneously ignore these problems seems inconsistent. 
Moreover we now see that ontological additivity with its degenerately simple combination 
relations begs important questions concerning the reality of relations. A more profound and 
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 ‗If there is a book of Nature, it is written in the language of mathematics‘ (attributed to Galileo). Once again, the 
distinction drawn in [Bennett [forthcoming]] between parthood slots and their occupiers is of use in clarifying that a 
structural relation may be irreducible to a list of its relata, even where that structural relation is the part-whole 
relation.  
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objective debate on this question would be both enjoyable and instructive.
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